Amid new escalations in Armenia: Interests & alternatives
The tense situation in Armenia and the region are the subject of daily politics, discussions in the country. Discussions and analyses that are conducted in two extremes for reasons of voter maximisation: Calming on the part of the government that everything is under control and nothing will happen on the one hand, and hysteria and panic-mongering on the part of some of the opposition that a new large-scale war is imminent.
Military friction, political pressure, but no large-scale war
There is no dichotomous answer between “all is well” and “a new war” for such a complex question. To better discuss what is happening and what will happen, we need to take a closer look at Azerbaijan’s interests, risk factors and actors in the region. First of all, what is Azerbaijan’s motivation for the current nationalist statements as well as military friction? Baku is trying to get the maximum concessions from Armenia after a won war. To this end, Azerbaijan uses a repertoire of instruments: Threats, military incidents in border regions, peace offers with preconditions. Baku’s priority goals are ideally the recognition by Armenia of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan including Nagorno-Karabakh, the demarcation of the border and the corridor in Syunik. Nationalist statements in the direction of Zangezur and Yerevan can at the present time at least be regarded as symbolic and rhetorical politics. After all, Azerbaijan, like Armenia, is not interested in a renewed, large-scale war from the current standpoint. Analysts in Azerbaijan know very well that a new war – this time in Armenia – would entail too great risks for the country.
A renewed war over the region would mean the violation of red lines for a number of countries – not for normative reasons, but also for reasons of self-interest.
While in the Nagorno-Karabakh war most states exercised neutrality and restraint, it would be different in a war over Armenia itself. This is because, from the perspective of the international community, the Nagorno-Karabakh war was a war over a country that is not recognised by the international community. Armenia, on the other hand, is recognised by all states except Pakistan, including Turkey and Azerbaijan. A renewed war over the region would mean the violation of red lines for a number of countries – not for normative reasons, but also for reasons of self-interest. Since member states of the UN are not interested in any change of whatever state borders. This is one of the reasons why Nagorno-Karabakh was not recognised for 30 years, and it will also be a reason why the international community and leading states would not accept serious border changes in favour of Azerbaijan – not least to avoid precedents. In general, there are very few cases of border changes in modern human history.
The second factor is the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. Scepticism about the role of some CSTO states may well be justified with regard to Armenia, but on the one hand Armenia has no significant alternative security guarantees and a new Nagorno-Karabakh war with a renewed military victory by Azerbaijan is not in Russia’s interest. It is only a question of the self-interests of regional actors such as Russia, Iran, Georgia or Turkey and the extent to which these interests overlap or conflict with those of Armenia. With regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, it is in Russia’s interest to strengthen its own influence in the region – and the deployment of peacekeeping troops is a good foundation for this. Resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in favour of Azerbaijan would make Russian peacekeepers or the Russian presence in general needless – or at least less relevant. On the other hand, the Russian side is equally uninterested in getting involved in a military conflict with Azerbaijan, an important trading partner. Stability around Nagorno-Karabakh is currently in Russia’s interest.
A large-scale war, as circulated by some representatives in Armenia, is unlikely from today’s perspective. The risks for Azerbaijan would be too high – and this is understood in Baku. On the other hand, constant military escalations in the border region will remain the order of the day, at least in the near future. On the one hand, Azerbaijan is trying to persuade Armenia to give in, to create new facts, to advance its own agenda and, above all, to test how far it can go.
Demarcation process and Synuik-corridor: A question of risk analysis
However, these escalations will continue until there is rapprochement and, possibly, demarcation of the borders. Indeed, demarcation may be a very unpopular issue and could have painful consequences for Armenia if negotiations go badly, but the non-demarcation of the borders will have more fatal consequences in the long run. Moscow and CSTO argue their military passivity not least with the fact that the borders have not been demarcated so far and the border areas are thus disputed. This makes it particularly difficult for the Armenian side to get a request for assistance through to the CSTO. The question of whether or not this is a delaying tactic on the part of the CSTO in order to avoid becoming involved in the conflict remains open. Demarcation of the borders would create clarity in the border area and make future Azerbaijani infiltration less likely. However, a possible demarcation must also take into account the risks: Above all, however, it is also in Azerbaijan’s interest to complete the demarcation of the border – since Azerbaijan also hopes that this will lead to the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Such a step would have to be carefully weighed up by Armenian risk analysts and would probably be too dangerous from a current point of view. It would mean the final surrender of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Should such a step be considered, serious concessions must be made by the Azerbaijani side. However, it is doubtful whether this is possible given the current balance of power. A second option would be the demarcation of the border with the exclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh. In the current conflict of interests, this would be a preferable option for Armenia. In both cases, however, the basis of trust between the two states would first have to be established. Nationalist threatening gestures from Baku are of course not useful for this. Regardless of which of these options is considered and whether a demarcation is sought on the Armenian side at all, Armenian security experts must take the strength ratio into account and make a cost-benefit calculation.
A second issue here is the Syunik Corridor, which is to be created between Azerbaijan and the exclave of Nakhichevan, according to Baku, thus creating a theoretical land connection between Constantinople and Baku. However, there are different shades here as well: If there is to be an “opening of the lines of communication”, the question is how the corridor will be established and by whom it will be controlled. The Azerbaijani preferred solution would be a corridor over which Armenia has no sovereign rights and which would be controlled by Azerbaijani, Turkish or, if necessary, Russian forces. Such an option would severely endanger Armenian sovereignty and further isolate the country. However, such a corridor would also isolate Iran.
However, these escalations will continue until there is rapprochement and, possibly, demarcation of the borders.
This would not only restrict the route between Iran and Armenia per se, but also the Iranian connection to Georgia and, by extension, across the Black Sea to Europe. In addition, such a corridor would greatly increase Turkish influence in Iran’s sphere of interest. Iran can be named as the country that would suffer the most from such a corridor to Armenia. And in general, an increase in Turkish influence on this scale would probably not be in the interest of some European states either. This would also mean the end of possible future alternative gas supplies from Iran to Europe. Whether an avoidance of the corridor is realistic depends not least on the negotiations and promises between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, since it is anchored in the 9/10 November treaty, a complete averting of this idea is likely to be difficult to achieve, especially since Russia, as a treaty broker, is interested in ensuring that the negotiated points are implemented in this way. Moreover, an Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Europe link has always been viewed with fundamental scepticism in Moscow.
Reactivation of Foreign Ministry, the Minsk group and multivectoral policy
What is generally less helpful to the Armenian political landscape are illusory and unserious discussions at party and sometimes media level. When politicians – of whatever shade – talk about a possible return of Shushi, Hadrut and other areas through negotiations, these demands have nothing to do with political reality. Some of the politicians even talk about annulling the Treaty of Kars or restoring the Treaty of Sevres. There are only two cases in which these wishes can be fulfilled: If Armenia offers something in return that the Azerbaijani or Turkish side is interested in, or in the case of war. In both cases, I see little chance of success. Other ways of achieving these goals – for example, through organisations, personal relations with some political officials – do not exist and do not correspond to the principles of political realism. Such dubious discourses are harmful to pragmatic and real-political action.
The absence of a foreign minister and the prime minister’s unilateral actions have severely damaged the functioning of Armenian diplomacy.
For the Armenian side, regardless of the foreign policy options to be chosen, the priority must be to establish a functioning foreign ministry, not to undermine the authority of its own foreign ministry, to ensure a sober cost-benefit analysis of all options and to reactivate the Minsk Group. The absence of a foreign minister and the prime minister’s unilateral actions have severely damaged the functioning of Armenian diplomacy. The illusory optimistic analyses with the aim of generating votes and the lack of critical think tanks strongly damage the analytical skills of Armenian diplomacy. Last but not least, the 9/10 November agreement de facto kicked France and the USA out of the negotiation process by Russia. Restoring this group would, on the one hand, create more room for manoeuvre and possibilities for action for France, which tends to be pro-Armenian, and would also create a balance between Russia and the United States, thereby at least partially limiting the Russian monopoly on the Caucasus. In this context, however, it is very important to consolidate additional relations with Western countries without damaging relations with Russia. Regardless of the debate of the inefficiency of the CSTO and the pro-Azerbaijani positioning of some member states, an exit from this organisation would cause greater damage. Armenia does not have the luxury of breaking away from one alliance to join another, especially since membership in NATO or the EU are highly unrealistic in realpolitik terms.
A multivectoral foreign policy with similarly good relations with both the United States and Russia, and above all France, would be an ideal state of the country’s foreign policy orientation. The Eastern European Partnership and the EU’s financial and technical assistance clearly show that cooperation with the EU is possible, at least in the technical and financial fields, without upsetting the Kremlin.