Levon Ter-Petrosyan: The mastermind of Armenian realpolitik
“Character shows itself in times of crisis” soberly stated the former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who himself was considered the nation’s crisis manager. A statement that fits all too well with Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan. After all, in order to measure the achievements and efforts of Armenian leaders, it is important to take the time context into account. In 1991, Armenia found itself in the aftermath of a major earthquake, with a collapsed economy, lack of army and administrative structures. The country was de facto structurally and institutionally non-existent at that time and, on top of that, was in a military conflict with an economically and demographically superior counterpart. No president or prime minister of Armenia in the country’s modern history has inherited such a problematic heritage. And yet Levon Ter-Petrosyan is regarded by the Armenian public as a controversial figure, either with clear opponents or supporters. Who was Armenia’s first president and why were his foreign policy and state-building achievements so instrumental for the country?
Establishment of a state-apparatus and army in times of instability
We are used to live in a world community where, in the case of a victory of whatever kind, everyone is praised, but in the case of a defeat, a single person, usually the head of government, is held responsible. Nevertheless, one thing is certain: In the period between 1991 and 1994, Armenia was able to develop a state apparatus and build an army within a very short time – almost an impossibility in times of war. A look at some post-Soviet or post-Yugoslav countries shows that 15 or even 20 years after the independents, not even remotely similar structures were created. There is no doubt that not all institutions have been established as they should have been. Certainly, a better foundation could have been built in peacetime. However, taking into account the circumstances of the time, the struggle for existence and the economic collapse, it must be stated that the establishment of the state in the early years – despite some shortcomings – was one of the reasons for the military organisation and the subsequent diplomatic successes.
After 1998, the Armenian authorities have been talking about the “dark and cold years” without explaining to the population why these years were “dark and cold”. Due to their own profiling, they failed to explain to the population that the darkness and cold, the lack of electricity were the costs of a military victory. A military conflict in which Armenia had to sell its own electricity to neighbouring Georgia in order to finance the war per se. Daily explosions of gas pipelines, train tracks are only a few side factors that have hardly been mentioned in the last twenty years. First and foremost, one should not forget that most post-Soviet states were confronted with similar problems, but were not involved in a large-scale war.
Bishkek-Protocols: The inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh
Much more important and formative for the person of Levon Ter-Petrosyan, however, are not so much the domestic political concerns, but much more the foreign policy concerns. Not only in Armenia, but also in the perception of contemporary politicians, he is regarded as a realpolitik hardliner who puts political pragmatism and statehood above ideological concerns. It is precisely this pragmatism and political realism that has been lacking in Armenia, especially between 1998 and 2008, and increasingly from 2018 onwards. Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s correct predictions are not due to random clairvoyance, but to a fundamental understanding of international relations in terms of realism. The basic essence of political realism in any state action is: decisions to act must always be based on one’s own strength or possibilities. State actions should not be dogmatic and fall victim to political short-termism, but should be designed for the long term.
State actions should not be dogmatic and fall victim to political short-termism, but should be designed for the long term.
In 1994, Armenia achieved in the Bishkek Protocols what would have been inconceivable in many similar conflict cases: Nagorno-Karabakh was de facto recognised as a party to the conflict and was allowed to co-sign the ceasefire. A fact that Azerbaijani diplomats fought against with all their might and failed to do so in 1994. Azerbaijan initially tried to prevent Nagorno-Karabakh from signing and then to relativise Nagorno-Karabakh’s signature through a fourth envoy – namely an Azerbaijani representative from Nagorno-Karabakh. It was only in the era of Robert Kocharyan that the Azerbaijani diplomatic corps was able to achieve the exclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh from the negotiation process. The inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh as a party to the conflict gave the Armenian side a de facto voting advantage, a de facto veto and most importantly, de facto recognition by Azerbaijan. By leaving Nagorno-Karabakh out of the negotiation process, further negotiations took place directly between Yerevan and Baku – a fatal weakening of the Armenian position.
Political pragmatism above emotionalism
In the period between 1994 and 1998, Armenian diplomats achieved a second milestone. Thanks to the administration of Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Armenian and French diplomats, Armenia was de facto not recognised as an aggressor by the international community. The formulations in the UN resolutions were not the least influential factor in this. “We were afraid every day that the international community would see us as the aggressor and that Turkey would intervene,” remarked Vazgen Sargsyan meaningfully in a speech. And this is exactly what was averted during the war and after 1994. As mentioned at the beginning, in political realism, pragmatic, but not ideological decisions are important: This also allows one to understand Ter-Petrosyan’s approach of not making genocide recognition a state demand and a foreign policy priority. Although genocide recognition is an important demand on a normative level, it would severely limit Armenia’s foreign policy. Therefore, the diaspora or parts of NGOs should take care of this, but not the state. This made it possible for Armenia to at least seek a gradual normalisation of relations with Turkey. Later, Serzh Sargsyan understood this in 2009 and took it up, but failed to do so to some extent. The adoption of emotional demands of the diaspora at the state level was one of the fatal mistakes of the Kocharyan administration between 1998 and 2008, because it was not the state that was supposed to represent the interests of the diaspora, but the other way round. During the Kocharyan era, the issue of genocide recognition was upgraded by the state, partly as a reaction to and means of pressure on Turkish politics. It was during this period that many of the “historical commissions” took place. This upgrading of the issue may have been correct from an emotional point of view, but it was immensely harmful to Armenian foreign policy and did not correspond to the logic of political pragmatism.
The ”compromise”-approach versus “status-quo”-solution
The third and most important aspect of Ter-Petrosyan was his willingness to compromise on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. In Armenian politics, there were increasingly two camps until 2020: the camp of those in favour of freezing the conflict, i.e. status quo, and those who wanted to reach the earliest possible compromise. The argumentation of the “status quo” faction was based on the fact that, on the one hand, a long period of de facto independence would eventually lead to legal recognition and, on the other, on possible better agreements at a later date. This position was held by Robert Kocharyan, Vardan Oskanyan and to some extent Serzh Sargsyan until 2008/2011. However, this approach can only work if two militarily, demographically and economically more or less equally strong forces are involved. The preservation of the status quo requires its own political and military power. Levon Ter-Petrosyan, on the other hand, believed that the Armenian position will become weaker and weaker with each passing year due to obvious demographic and economic processes in comparison to Azerbaijan, which has oil revenues. He argued that the time factor should not be neglected and favours Azerbaijan in particular. As early as 1997/98, he made it clear that solutions that could be obtained through compromise at this stage would be lost in the course of a war in 20 years’ time. On a populist level, Ter-Petrosyan’s pragmatic and realpolitik approach was equated with treason. An illusion in which diplomatic solutions were considered treason and pseudo-patriotic approaches responsible for today’s situation were established as state dogma. Agreements are always associated with uncertainties: But if there has ever been a time in modern Armenian history when Azerbaijan was seriously interested in a ceasefire, it is the period up to 1998 or 2002. And these compromise proposals, which were to be fulfilled in phases, also included the deployment of peacekeeping troops, which are to be seen as a guarantee factor for Armenia. This conviction was also shared by those diplomats who settled the Bishkek Protocols in 1994. But it was to turn out that the intoxication of victory was meant to blur the analytical abilities of an entire nation for twenty years. Those who thwarted this approach could not establish better treaties in the next twenty years, because exactly what Armenian diplomats warned about as early as 1997 has come to pass: With each passing year, the Azerbaijani position became stronger and a peace agreement less likely.
With each passing year, the Azerbaijani position became stronger and a peace agreement less likely.
So, who finally is he? Someone who established good relations with Russia as well as with the United States and France on the basis of a multivectoral foreign policy. Above all, a realpolitik politician who for twenty years, however reluctantly his proposals were heard in the Armenian landscape, repeated them again and again with full conviction – regardless of loss of reputation. After all, foreign policy decisions should not be based on the mood of the population, but on the analysis of experts. One can undoubtedly debate whether individual foreign policy measures of the 1990s were right or wrong, but what can be said with certainty is: Levon Ter-Petrosyan is the mastermind of Armenian realpolitik. A statesman and diplomat whose merits will only be understood many years later.